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Abstract decisions for which it was carried out in the fust place. We 
called that the Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD) principle. 
In many diagnosis-and-repair domains, diagnos- 
tic reasoning cannot be abstracted from repair 
actions, nor from actions necessary to obtain di- Reasoner 
agnostic information. We call these exploratory- 
corrective domains. In TraumAID 2.0, a con- 
sultation system for multiple trauma manage- 
ment, we have developed and implemented a 
framework for reasoning in such domains which 
integrates diagnostic reasoning with planning 
and action. In this paper, we present Goal- 
Directed Diagnosis (GDD), the diagnostic rea- Figure l: Basic Cycle of Reasoning, Planning and Action 
soning component of this framework Taking 
the view that a diagnosis is only worthwhile to In addition, we showed that in systems where activity is 
the extent that it can affect subsequent decisions, necessary for both diagnostic and therapeutic purposes, 
GDD focuses on the formation of appropriate it is advantageous to integrate diagnostic reasoning and 
goals for its complementary planner. planning capabilities. An architecture called Exploratory- Corrective Management (ECM) was proposed, in which 
a repeated basic cycle of diagnostic reasoning, planning 
1 Prologue and action is used (Figure 1). The ECM architecture was 
shown to satisfy the following desiderata for exploratory- 
corrective domains: 
In many domains, it is common to distinguish reason- 
ing and activity concerned with what problems need be 1. It allows interleaving diagnosis and repair. 
addressed from that reasoning concerned with how to ad- 2. IL positions the diagnostic reasoner to dress those problems. As such, Artificial Intelligence (Al) 
subsumes as separate sub-disciplines diagnosis research, (a) set diagnostic and therapeutic goals; 
seeking the source (or sources) of a system's faulty behav- (b) use incoming evidence to monitor the actions 
ior, and planning research, concerned with the construe- and/or other events; 
tion of action plans to achieve certain goals. Based on that (c) reason about changes in knowledge or state to 
dichotomy, most diagnostic programs take a diagnosis as adapt current goals. 
their objective. 3. It positions the planner to mediate between concur- 
In last year's workshop, in a paper titled "Towards Goal- rent diagnostic and therapeutic needs. 
Diagnosis", we argued this may be inadequate. TraumAID 2.0 mebber et 923 is a consultation sys- In trauma management, for example, therapy is the ulti- tem f,, the diagnosis and treatment of multiple trauma 
mate objective and diagnosis is the ''price" that one has to which implements the ECM architecture. A fomaliza- pay in order to achieve that objective. In such domains, tion of its goal-direcled diagnostic reasoning is the fo- diagnosis should only persist so long as it can affect those cus of *is paper, whereas its complementary planning 
'The author was supported in part by a gaduate fellow- paradigm, Progressive Horizon Pm)* is 
ship, ARO Grant DAAU)3-89C0031PRI, and National Library described elsewhere Pym0n et a1 921. Each consultation 
of Medicine 1 ~ 0  ~ ~ 0 5 1 2 1 7 - 0 1 .  m e  validation pa of session in TraumAID 2.0 consists of several cycles of rea- 
TraumAID 2.0 is supported by an AHCPR grant HS06740-02. soning, pli3IIIIing and acting. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews re- 
lated work. Section 3 begins the introduction of GDD with 
a formal rule-based language and a simple inference from 
observations to conclusions and goals. Diagnostic prob- 
lems are defined in this language and their solutions cor- 
respond to the closure of that inference. Taking a higher 
level perspective on the role of GDD reasoning within a 
complete ECM session, Section 4 begins with a meta-level 
algorithmic description of the ECM algorithm, continues 
with a short discussion of issues pertaining to the actual 
implementation of diagnostic and therapeutic strategies in 
such systems, and concludes with an illustrative example 
of a complete session. Section 5 extends the paradigm to 
effectively deal with conrradictory information. 
2 Related Work 
2.1 Formal Diagnosis 
Recent years have seen significant advances in formal ap- 
proaches to diagnosis. A large number of approaches and 
frameworks have been suggested: probabilistic classifiers 
and discriminators, logical consistency-based and abduc- 
tive paradigms, graph-based formulations in which causal 
and coincidental relations are modeled, etc. Some of the 
frameworks combine and/or unify two or more paradigms. 
However, all these these formalizations take diagnosis - 
broadly defined as a characterization of the current state 
of affairs - as their solution and goal. Our Goal-Directed 
Diagnostic paradigm takes a different view of diagnosis 
and its objectives. 
To understand this view, consider that general theories 
of diagnosis give rise to a (sometimes large) number of 
hypothetical characterizations that are consistent with, or 
that explain the observed failure. In such instances, it is 
necessary to choose among such possibilities. An impor- 
tant observation made by [Poole & Provan 901 is that the 
optimality of a diagnosis must depend on post-diagnosis 
goals. To that end, [Provan & Poole 911 advocate the use 
of utilities in order to choose among different potential di- 
agnoses. [Poole & Provan 911 take that approach one step 
further, realizing that there is often no need for a complete 
explanation and that the granularity of a solution depends 
on its uses, and also on available tests. 
Realistically, diagnosis is rarely an independent process: 
more often it serves the purpose of another process, e.g. 
repair. The GDD paradigm, presented here, is part of a 
total approach for reasoning in exploratory-corrective do- 
mains which combines diagnostic reasoning, planning and 
action [Rymon 931. In that framework, the main purpose 
of diagnostic reasoning is generating proper goals; diagno- 
sis purely for characterization's sake becomes a secondary 
concern. 
Friedrich et al 911 share much of that insight. Consid- 
ering diagnosis as part of an overall diagnosis-and-repair 
process, they correctly observe that repair does not always 
require a complete diagnostic explanation. Unlike other 
formalizations, their theory has no explicit notion of a di- 
agnosis. Instead, a sequence of tests and repair actions is 
sought, that if applied to the current state, will imply (as 
in a logical proof) a restoration of the diagnosed system to 
a proper working condition. Presented not as a theory of 
diagnosis but as a theory of repairplanning, their work ap- 
plies a possible-models planning approach [Winslett 881 to 
a diagnostic domain. The link between diagnosis and re- 
pair planning is also emphasized by pepper & Kahn 871. 
[Rushby & Crow 911 formalize reconfiguration, a limited 
form of repair, using an extension of Reiter's theory of 
diagnosis [Reiter 871. 
In domains such as trauma management, planning and 
action are necessary for both diagnosis and repair. At the 
same time, diagnostic reasoning and activity are necessary 
to (a) set goals for, (b) monitor the execution of, and (c) 
verify the actual results of actions. 
Current work on sequential diagnosis has often taken a 
simplistic view of information acquisition. While the po- 
tential, or expected, discriminatory power of a given piece 
of information for the problem at hand is considered, the 
activity necessary to obtain it is not (i.e. either only sim- 
ple questions are considered, or a simple cost function is 
attached to every piece of information). Of course, re- 
searchers have realized that this approach is inadequate: 
"One limitation of DART in its present form is that it 
doesn't take into account the cost of tests .... Unfortu- 
nately, the evaluation of test cost can be quite di@ult 
because of dependencies on sequencing and grouping." 
[Genesereth 841 
Planning researchers, as early as STRIPS, have studied 
these issues extensively. The ECM architecture thus uses 
its planning capabilities not only for repair, but also for 
information acquisition. It also uses planning to mediate 
between diagnostic and therapeutic activities when multi- 
ple problems concurrently require both [Rymon 931. That 
strong tie between diagnosis and therapy is common in 
medical practice and is evident in many A1 medical man- 
agement systems1. What we add here is a formalization 
of the relationship between the two. 
2.2 AMORD 
AMORD [deKleer et al 771 is a general purpose prob- 
lem solver which has accompanying truth maintenance 
and planning facilities. The main thesis behind AMORD 
is that combinatorially explosive reasoning can often be 
avoided if a problem solver reasons explicitly about its 
own reasoning. Explicitly encoded reasoning control is 
shown effective in avoiding irrelevant, or useless infer- 
ences. TraurnAID's GDD reasoner shares this intuition. 
'In an article in the Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence, 
p. 589, referring to MYCIN, Shortliffe and Rennels write: "Al- 
though MYCm is often described as a diagnostic pmgram, its 
principal motivation was therapy planning ". 
The key difference between the two paradigms is their paradigm to more expressive domains in a consistent fash- 
distinct objectives: while AMORD's objective is to avoid ion. Importantly, it allows explicit representation of con- 
irrelevant or useless inferences, the objective of GDD is tradictions (cf. section 5). 
to avoid unimportant, and possibly dangerous, actions. 
Although GDD can also be viewed as a general purpose 
reasoning scheme, the result of the distinct objectives is 
that even though both systems compute beliefs and goals, 
AMORD focuses on the former, whereas GDD focuses on 
the latter. A more detaiIed technical comparison between 
AMORD and the MVL-based inference system used to 
implement GDD can be found in Rymon 931. 
In this new fonnalization of GDD, each proposition is as- 
signed a value drawn from the cross product of two bilat- 
tices: one representing belief, the other attitude. The no- 
tion of belief is interpreted regularly, whereas the attitude 
component represents problem-solving control informa- 
tion and measures the relevance of acquiring information 
about, or achieving the condition described by, the partic- 
ular proposition. Importantly, each of these bilattices still 
maintains both truth and knowledge sub-component.. 
3 A Formulation of Goal-Directed Diagnosis Within Ginsberg.s paradigm, domain knowledge is ex- 
Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD) begins with the point of 
view that diagnosis is only worthwhile if it has the po- 
tential to affect future decisions. Thus, while we accept 
the common definition of a diagnosis as a case charac- 
terization, we believe that different purposes can lead to 
dzflerent characterizations of the same situation. For ex- 
ample, different purposes may lead to different refinement 
efforts. GDD allows explicit encoding of purposes, which 
it uses to guide its problem solving. More specifically, 
throughout a problem solving session, the GDD reasoner 
will maintain both a belief - a description of the current 
characterization, and an attitude - encoding a sense of 
purpose by pointing to goals worth pursuing. 
In a recurrent cycle, the GDD reasoner takes as input 
a diagnostic problem, characterized by (1) observations; 
and (2) mappings (rules) from from observations to con- 
clusions (belief), and from observations and conclusions 
to goals (attitude). A solution to such problem is a new 
attitude-belief assignment. Goals, propositions regarded 
as relevant by the current attitude, are the addressed by 
the accompanying planner and Served by the actor. New 
observations result in a modified diagnostic problem, and 
a new cycle is initiated. 
In this section, we describe a rule-based language for spec- 
ifying diagnostic problems in GDD a corresponding infer- 
ence scheme. 
3.1 Underlying Framework: Multi-Valued Logics 
Multi-Valued Logics (MVL) [Ginsberg 881 is a formal 
framework for inference in which each proposition is as- 
signed not only a truth value, corresponding to the strength 
of belief in that proposition being true orfalse, but also a 
knowledge assessment, measuring roughly the amount of 
knowledge used to derive such belief. Bilattices, in which 
one partial order corresponds to the truthfulness measure 
and the other to the knowledge one, are used by MVL as 
domains for truth-value assignment. 
Our goaldirected diagnostic paradigm (GDD) was first 
formalized using a three-valued logic: true, false and un- 
known [Rymon et a1 911. This paper presents an MVL- 
based reformulation of GDD. The immediate result of 
this reformulation is the ability to extend the inference 
pressed by &st-order formulae, and thus requires 
an underlying theorem prover. In contrast, TraurnAID 
uses a rule-based representation which is simpler to han- 
dle, but incomplete in general. Instead of reconstruct- 
ing TraumAID's knowledge, we chose to specialize Gins- 
berg's theory to the rule-based case. While the material 
presented next is self-contained, the reader is referred to 
[Ginsberg 881 for a more complete coverage of MVL. 
3.2 Attitude and Belief 
During the diagnostic process, the GDD reasoner will 
maintain and update an attitude and a belief for propo- 
sitional statements. To remain general, propositions may 
be any fact about the patient or the world that the reasoner 
may know to hold, may know not to hold, may assume, 
may want to know whether hold, may want to achieve. 
may be confused about, etc. The reasoner's attitude to- 
wards and/or belief in a given proposition will change over 
time as a result of new information becoming available, 
new inferences drawn, activity carried out, etc. 
Definition 3.1 A Lattice 
A lattice is a triple (L,A,V), where L is its domain, A 
("meet") and V ("join") are binary operations from L onto 
itself that are (1) idempotent, i.e. a A a=a, a V a=a; (2) 
commutative, i.e. a A b=b A a, a V b=b V a; (3) associative, 
i.e. (a A b)Ac=aA(b A c), (a V b)Vc=aV(b V c), and (4) obey 
the absorption laws, i.e. aA(a V b)=a, aV(a A b)=a. 
Alternatively, a lattice can be defined as a partially or- 
dered set, any two elements of which have a greatest 
lower bound (glb) and a least upper bound (lub). The 
two definitions coincide by taking lub(a, b)=a V b, and 
glb(a, b)=a A b. A lattice is said to be complete if lub and 
glb can be defined for any subset of the lattice's elements. 
Thus, any lattice with a finite domain is complete. 
Definition 3 2  A Bilattice 
A bilattice is a sextuple (B,A,V,.,+,-) such that: 
1. L1 dgf (B,A,V) and L2 dgf (B,.,+) are both complete 
lattices; and 
2. 1:B + B is a mapping such that: 
' 3 3  Goals (a) l2 = 1; and 
(b) 7 is a homomorphism from L1 to its dual 
- 
L1 gf (B,V,A) and from L2 to itself. 
Figure 2: Basic Truth-Knowledge Bilattice 
Ginsberg discusses bilattices that are based on two partial 
orders: truth-wise ( S t )  and knowledge-wise (Sk). That 
is, each proposition is described by how strongly we be- 
lieve it is true, and by how much knowledge was involved 
in inferring that belief. The smallest nontrivial bilattice 
(Figure 2) has four points: T (absolute truth), F (false), 
U (unknown), and I (contradictory). In that bilattice, the 
<, partial order defines one lattice (B,A,V), whereas the 
- 
<k defines another lattice (B,-,+). In any truth-knowledge 
bilattice, negation reverses the truth capacity of a propo- 
sition, leaving its knowledge capacity unchanged. In par- 
ticular, within the basic bilattice, 7 maps T to F and vice 
versa, leaving U and I untouched. 
Two, possibly distinct, bilattices are used in GDD as do- 
mains for attitude and belief respectively: 
Definition 3 3  Attitude and Belief 
Given a set of primitive propositions H gf 
9 an attitude maps H to an attitude bilattice BA 
a belief maps H to a belief bilattice BB 
an attitude-belief combines the two and maps H to 
the cross product BA x BB. Conversely, it can aIso 
be viewed as a pair ( $ A ,  $ B )  of attitude and belief. 
For our purposes here, we shall take both B A  and BB 
to be represented by the 4-point bilattice. The belief 
bilattice, following Ginsberg's suggestion, is defined by 
the truth-knowledge partial orders. In the attitude bilat- 
tice, a proposition is described by its relevance (5,) and 
the knowledge used to derive that relevance ( s k )  . No- 
tably, one's knowledge with respect to the truthfulness of 
a proposition need not equal, in general, one's knowledge 
with respect to the relevance of that same proposition. 
Technically, the extreme points in the belief bilattice are 
called T, and F, whereas same points are called R (for 
relevant) and I (for irrelevant) in the attitude bilattice. 
Extensions to more complex bilattices are discussed in 
[Ginsberg 88, Rymon 931 
We shall say that an attitude-belief is strongly grounded 
if belief is restricted to {T, F). We shall say that it is 
weakly grounded if such restriction holds for all relevant 
propositions. 
Goals are a semalltic interpretation of an attitude-belief 
assignment to propositions. Generally speaking, a propo- 
sition p is a goaI if its attitude assignment is high on the 
relevance partial order (5,). Of course, not every such 
proposition need be attempted; it may already be believed 
to hold (belief=T). In general, one has to define which 
combinations of relevance and achievement levels need 
be addressed, in what order, etc. Such considerations, 
however, are beyond the scope of, and do not affect the 
operation of our GDD reasoner. Within the ECM archi- 
tecture, such determination is left to the planner. 
A goal's nature, in particular its characterization as diag- 
nostic or therapeutic, plays an important role in deciding 
whether or not to address it. Taking a somewhat simpli- 
fied view, a diagnostic goal, aimed at determination, may 
be regarded satisfied whenever the proposition is proved 
either true or false. A therapeutic goal, on the other hand, 
will only be satisfied with the actual achievement of the 
condition it describes (i.e. belief=T). 
Rules used by GDD to express knowledge have their an- 
tecedents expressed solely in belief terms. However, in 
encoding diagnostic and therapeutic strategies in GDD, 
we found it useful to also use the relevance (or irrele- 
vance) of a goal. Thus, a mapping from the attitude- to 
the belief-bilattice was added: 
T a = R  
atfifude(a) gf { F a = I  
a otherwise 
That mapping models, roughly, the belief in relevance of 
the given proposition. 
3.4 A Language for Representing Diagnostic Knowledge 
We use Prolog-like rules to represent knowledge. Two 
types of rules are be used: one for infemng belief, the 
other for inferring goals. 
Definition 3.4 An Antecedent 
An antecedent is recursively defined as either: 
1. a primitive proposition h; or 
2. attitude(h), where h is a proposition; or 
3. -a, where a is an antecedent; or 
4. true(a), false(a), unknown(a), or contradictory(a), 
where a is an antecedent; or 
5. known(a), unless(a), or compatible-with(a), where a 
is an antecedent. 
Definition 3 5  Rules 
A rule R has two parts: a body, or a premise, which is a 
set of antecedents; and a header, or consequent, which is 
a single proposition. GDD has two types of rules: 
I. Evidential rules afJect belief: They map evidence and 
lower-level conclusions to conclusions: 
Ant1 A Anta A . . . A Ant, d 
For example, the following evidential rule concludes 
whether a patient's shock is due to abdominal bleed- 
ing: 
Shock A 
-Single-wound-toupper_chest A 
unless(Pericardia1-Tamponade) A 
unless(MassiveHemothorax) A 
unless(TensionPneumothorax) 
=+ Shock~ofpossibleabdomina1~rigin 
2. Goal Setting rules afJect attitude. lkey map evidence 
and conclusions to goals, or more precisely to ani- 
tude: 
Antl AAnt2 A .  .. A Ant, ~g 
For example, the following goal-setting rule con- 
cludes whether it is relevant to know whether a pa- 
tient has hematuria. 
Gunshot-wound~oabdomen A 
Bulletinabdomen D Hematuria 
A fact may often be provable in several alternative ways. 
Similarly, a goal may need to be set in a variety of con- 
texts. We therefore allow a conclusion to be made via 
a number of evidential rules, and a goal to be set via a 
number of goal-setting rules. 
Conversely, we allow the same proposition to serve as the 
header of both goal-setting and evidential rules. In par- 
ticular, as header to a goal-setting rule, a diagnostic or 
therapeutic goal means that the rule is used to conclude 
that the goal is worth adopting. An evidential rule whose 
header is that same goal is used to conclude whether or 
not it has been satisfied. Similarly, a goal-setting rule 
whose header is a clinical condition is used to conclude 
that it is relevant to investigate that condition. A similarly 
headed evidential rule is used to conclude whether or not 
the condition holds. Consider, for example, the diagnosis 
and repair of a pericardial tamponade2. During that pro- 
cess, corresponding diagnostic and therapeutic goals are 
instantiated, addressed, and satisfied: 
1. Setting a Diagnostic (knowledge) goal: 
( . . . ) D Pericardial-Tamponade 
"It is necessary to h o w  if the problem exists". 
2. Satisfying a Diagnostic (knowledge) goal: 
(. . . ) 3 Pericardial-Tamponade 
"Conclude that the problem exists". 
2~ pericardial tarnponade is a condition where blood fills 
the pericardial sac, pressuring the heart and interfering with its 
operation. 
3. Setting a Therapeutic goal: 
(. . . ) D Relievepressurepericardia2sac 
"It is necessary to address the problem". 
4. Satisfying a Therapeutic Goal: 
(. . . ) 3 Relievepressurepericardialsac 
'The problem has been successfully addressed". 
3.5 A Diagnostic Problem Instance 
Definition 3.6 A Diagnostic Problem Instance 
An instance of a diagnostic problem is a quadruple 
P dgf (H,RB,Mo,OBS) such that: 
H={hl, h 2 , .  . . , h, )  is a set of propositions; 
a RB is a set of evidential and goal-setting rules; 
Mo C H  is a set of observed manifestations (i.e. 
propositions for which we can, initially, assert that 
they are either true or false, with some degree of 
confidence); 
OBS : M o  + BB, is a belief (restricted to Mo). 
3.6 Inference 
In the basic form of inference, to be introduced next, a 
closure of the observations given the evidential and goal- 
setting rules is computed. The basic inference is simpler 
and more intuitive than that in [Ginsberg 881. In Section 
5, we will have to extend it to a form that is closer to 
Ginsberg's in order to support reasoning about contradic- 
tory information. In order to define the basic inferential 
closure, let us first define the semantic interpretation of 
rules. 
Definition 3.7 Belief Assignment for M Antecedent 
Let & )  be the current attitude-belief (defined on 
primitive propositions). For any antecedent (Ant), the 
belief in that antecedent, PB (Ant), is defined as follows: 
1. If Ant is a proposition h, q5; (Ant) q '~~(h ) ;  
2. If Ant has the form attitude(h), 
4; (Ant) dsf  attitude(^$* (h));  
3. If Ant has the form -.Ant', where Ant' is an an- 
tecedent, & (Ant) dAf -4; (Ant'); 
4. If Ant has the form f (Ant'), where Ant' is an an- 
tecedent, then 
If f is one of four belief predicates (true, false, 
unknown, contradictory), then 
4; (lruc(Antl)) dgf ( T 4; (Ant') = T F otherwise 
Similarly for known, *unless, and compatible- 
with; 
F q5;(Antt) = U 
a &(known(Antl)) I &(Ant') = l 
T otherwise 
r 4; (unless(Antl)) sf 
-4; (Ant') V 74; (known(Antl)) 
r $;(compatible - with(Antl)) dg 
4; (Ant') V -$;3 (known(Antl)) 
Belief predicates will be useful where reasoning in abso- 
lute terms is necessary, since they map terms to {TP). 
Thus, h and true(h), are interpreted differently. The same 
is true of -h and false(h). Similarly, ~known(h) refers to 
any situation in which a concrete belief cannot be reached 
whereas unknown(h) describes the particular such situa- 
tion (U) resulting from lack of information. In the basic 
bilattice, another member of the former class is I which 
corresponds to contradictory information. 
Definition 3.8 Belief Assignment for a Rule's Body 
Let ($A, $B) be an attitude-belief, R a rule with an- 
tecedents {Ant;),k,, , then define 
$k(body(R)) dgf A:= (Ant;) 
Definition 3.9 Consistent Inference (closure) 
An attitude-belief ($A, $B) is a consistent inference for a 
problem instance P iff 
1. It coincides with OBS, i.e V h€Mo. $~(h)=0BS(h); 
2. For any proposition d€H-Mo, let {R, } := ,  be all the 
evidential rules with d in their header, then 
$B(d) = vf=l$&(body(R,)); 
3. Similarly, for any proposition d€H, let be 
all the goal-setting rules with d in their header, then 
$A (d) = attit~de-~(~f=~$;3(body(R,))); 
Solving a diagnostic problem requires computing a consis- 
tent inference. While in general, there is no guarantee that 
such an inference is unique, computable, or even exists, 
the following algorithm is a straightforward, greedy at- 
tempt at computing it. It begins with the observations, as- 
suming all other propositions to be unknown (U). Then, in 
a forward-chaining fashion, it repeatedly enforces Defini- 
tion 3.9 until a fixed point (inferential closure) is reached. 
Algorithm 3.10 Computing an Inferential Closure 
1. Start off with the observations, by setting 
$A(h) U, for all ~ E H  
OBS(h) h E Mo 
otherwise 
2. Mark all the rules (indicating they need to be fired). 
3. Until none of the rules is marked, let R be such rule 
and let d be its header. 
r If R is an evidential rule, let { R , } ~ = ,  be the 
set of all evidential rules for d, and let v dgf 
 body(&)). If $ ~ ( d )  # v then set 
~ $ ~ ( d )  = v and mark all rules in which d ap- 
pears in the antecedents as needing to be fired. 
Similarly, if R is a god-setting rule, let {&):=, 
be the set of goal-setting rules for d, and let v sf 
vf,, 6 (body(&)). If attitude(dA (d)) # v 
then set $ ~ ( d )  = attitude-'(v) and mark aI1 
rules in which d appears in the antecedents as 
needing to be fired. 
Unmark R. 
3.7 Solving a Diagnostic Problem 
The formal definition of a solution in the GDD framework 
emphasizes its distinction from other diagnostic frarne- 
works. 
Definition 3.1 1 A Diagnostic Explanation (Diagnosis) 
Let ($A , $B) be the inferential closure for a problem in- 
stance P, then $B is the diagnostic explanation (diag- 
nosis) for P. It is weakly complete if ( $ A ,  4 ~ )  is weakly 
grounded (i.e. no relevant propositions are unknown), and 
strongly complete if ($A, $B) is strongly grounded (i.e. all 
propositions are known). 
Most formal diagnostic frameworks are content with a 
diagnosis as a solution. In GDD, we emphasize the im- 
portance of the goals, and consequently of the actions, 
adopted while arriving at a diagnosis. 
A complete diagnostic session consists of several cycles 
through the ECM architecture. In a given diagnosis-and- 
repair scenario, if the GDD principle is adopted, it is un- 
likely that a strongly complete diagnosis be sought. In the 
case of a weakly complete diagnosis, while all diagnostic 
goals have been fulfilled, some of the therapeutic goals 
may still need attention (recall that a therapeutic goal is 
satisfied only when it is assigned a T value. The important 
point, however, is that the degree to which a diagnosis is 
refined is to a great extent a function of potential actions, 
and of their expected outcomes. In the ECM architecture, 
the termination criterion is thus part of the planner. There- 
fore the importance of the attitude part of the inferential 
closure: it defines the goals which will be pursued next. 
Goals are the "architectural duty" of the GDD reasoner. 
Definition 3.12 A Solution to a Diagnostic Problem 
A solution to a diagnostic problem is the inferential clo- 
sure, i.e. the pair y ($A, $B). 
4 The Diagnostic-Therapeutic Process 
Having defined a solution to a single diagnostic problem, 
it is important to understand the overall process, i.e. a 
complete diagnostic-therapeutic session, as captured by 
repeated cycles of the ECM architecture. We begin with 
a meta-level algorithmic description of that process. We 
then discuss shortly issues pertaining to the irnplementa- 
tion of diagnostic and therapeutic strategies within that 
architecture, using the GDD paradigm. An illustrative ex- 
ample of a complete diagnostic-therapeutic session con- 
cludes this section. 
4.1 Integrating Diagnosis, Planning, and Action: 
The ECM Algorithm 
Algorithm 4.1 calls the diagnostic reasoner whenever new 
information appears. The solution it provides is used to 
guide the complementary planner in the choice of activity 
which, in turn, may provide new information to start a 
new cycle. 
Algorithm 4.1 ECM Diagnosis-and-Repair Algorithm 
1. Initialize ( d A ,  $ B )  to coincide with OBS; 
2. Compute an inferential closure for ( $ A ,  $ B ) ;  
3. Construct a plan P for the combination of goals in- 
dicated by ( $ A ,  $B ) ; 
4. Unless P is empty do 
a Execute P until the first new piece of informa- 
tion @,v) comes in; 
a Update rjB) to reflect (h,v); 
a Go to step 2; 
Note that the criterion to terminate diagnosis is not nec- 
essarily related to the concreteness (groundness) of the 
current characterization (the diagnostic explanation, or di- 
agnosis). Diagnosis terminates when the planner returns 
an empty plan, e.g. when all goals have been addressed 
or when no means are available for addressing remaining 
goals. Also note that any newly provided information, 
whether it has been called for or not, whether it is ac- 
quired via diagnostic or via therapeutic activity, will be 
used by the algorithm to refine its current diagnosis and 
possibly trigger new goals. 
4 3  Goal Inhibition: using GDD to encode Strategies 
To demonstrate its usefulness, we have used GDD to im- 
plement a number of diagnostic and therapeutic strate- 
gies drawn from the literature and from our experience in 
TraumAID. Two mechanisms that were useful in that task 
have already been presented: goal-setting rules, as a mean 
to drive goals, and planning, as a mean to resolve conflicts 
between competing goals. Goal inhibition, a third mech- 
anism which we have found usefkl in implementing such 
strategies, is presented next. For lack of space, we will 
not present the strategies themselves; the interested reader 
is referred to [Rymon 931. 
Trauma management presents an on-going interplay be- 
tween diagnosis and therapy in which goals often have to 
be delayed or even ignored. Goal interaction is generally 
addressed by TraumAID's planner, but since planning is 
extremely demanding computationally, much of the plan- 
ning effort can be saved if unnecessary, non-contributing, 
goals are inhibited before being passed on to the planner. 
The basic approach to goal inhibition is to qualify goal- 
setting rules by the negation of any inhibition condition. 
Consider, for example a patient with a right lumbar injury. 
Normally, such injury would suggest a possible duodenal 
injury: 
A standard test for duodenal injury is a CT scan. However, 
this lengthy and costly procedure should not be pursued 
independently if there is already a perceived need for a 
laparotomy. The surgical procedure will expose any duo- 
denal injury, if present. Thus, one could qualify the above 
rule as follows: 
Righflumbar-wound A 
unless(L.uparotomy-required) 
D ~uodenalinjury 
While correct, the problem with such inhibition scheme is 
that if the inhibition condition is complex, rules become 
even more complex and hard to maintain. In addition, 
overloading rules makes them less interpretable: the sep- 
arate function of each of a rule's antecedents becomes un- 
clear (cf. [Clancey 831). Instead, inhibiting relationships 
between goals and between goals and conclusions can be 
specified separately. For each goal g, we can define an 
inhibition clause which will then be compiled (as a macro 
expansion) into all of that goal's goal-setting rules. 
Definition 4.2 Goal Inhibition Clause 
Given a goal g, inhibit(g) is a clause(or clauses) specify- 
ing the conditions under which g should not be pursued. 
Technically, the macro expansion procedure for a goal in- 
hibition clause creates a new internal proposition called 
inhibit(g) and a set of rules headed by that proposition 
that correspond to the condition itself. In the above ex- 
ample, the following new rule is added: 
Then, we pad the body of every goal-setting rule for g as 
follows: body'(R) sf body(R) A -.true(inhibit(g)) 
An alternative approach to goal inhibition is based on an 
extension of GDD to allow negative conclusions (goals) 
in rule headers (cf. Section 5). Note that so far, rule 
headers have simply been proposition names and have 
been interpreted positively, i.e. a rule has been viewed 
as an argument for its header-proposition. The formal in- 
terpretation of rules headed by a negated proposition is 
somewhat complex, and requires work. Informally, we 
can think of a rule headed by -.p as an argument against 
p. Such extension to our representation allows a more 
natural (and convenient) form of goal-inhibition: it can 
simply be viewed as a "reason" not to pursue that goal. 
Taking that view, it is natural to consider that particular 
reason together with all other reasons for and against that 
goal's pursuit. Goal-inhibition rules are used for that pur- 
pose. Let g be the said goal, we add a rule of the form: 
inhibit(g) D ~ g .  
Under the framework discussed in Section 5, a contradic- 
tory attitude ( I )  will be assigned to a goal for which both 
a goal-setting and a goal-inhibition rule have succeeded. 
In our previous example, we will write: 
Another way in which goals can be effectively inhibited, 
and which is sometimes preferable in implementing di- 
agnostic strategies is to "force" a concrete value (i.e. T 
or F) on the goal's underlying proposition. Such an ap- 
proach will often be preferable when the real value of the 
inhibited goal can be inferred at the presence of the in- 
hibiting condition; scaled diagnosis, discussed next, is a 
case in point. Unfortunately, that is not always possible: 
for example, nothing can be concluded about whether or 
not a patient has a duodenal injury in the above example. 
The net effect of that approach is that the goal remains 
relevant, but is regarded achieved by the planner and thus 
not addressed. 
4 3  Example 
To illustrate the effect of multiple diagnostic and therapeu- 
tic cycles in TraurnAID 2.0's ECM architecture, we will 
follow a case from the initial observations and the sus- 
pected diagnosis, to its validation, its treatment and the 
verification of its success. 
Consider a patient presenting in the emergency room in 
stable condition, suffering a gun-shot wound to the left 
chest. A new diagnostic problem is instantiated with these 
observations. Let (dA, q5B) denote the system's current 
attitude-belief. Initially dA(h)=q5B(3)=U, for all proposi- 
tions hEH. As soon as the observations are reported, d B  
is set accordingly. 
In the next stage, the closure of (dA, dB) is computed. 
In particular, we use the following goal-setting rule to 
set the diagnostic goal SimpleHemothorax(Lefr), aimed at 
knowing whether or not the patient suffers a hemothorax3. 
At this point, if no other issues arise, control is trans- 
ferred to the planner. A planner such as TraumAID's 
current planner would recommend a Survey Chest X-Ray 
as a means of obtaining the desired information. 
Suppose the physician orders an X-ray, and from the X- 
ray reports signs of hemothorax and a compound fracture 
to the left ribs. While the latter information had not been 
solicited, the system's belief toward both propositions will 
3~ hemothorax is internal bleeding in the chest cavity, be- 
tween the lungs and the chest wall, that results in the collapse 
of a lung. 
be updated to T. (If X-ray reports are assumed to be com- 
plete, beliefs about all other features of the X-ray will be 
updated to F.) While each of these updated beliefs may 
trigger further investigation, for this example we will ig- 
nore all but the hemothorax finding. That finding triggers 
the evidential rule: 
The system thus changes its belief in the presence of 
hemothorax from U to T. That change may be interpreted 
as a satisfaction of the diagnostic goal set by (1). Note too 
that we must distinguish a hemothorax finding from the 
condition of having a hemothorax, since the condition can 
be diagnosed in other ways, such as through the presence 
of decreased breath sounds, as in the following rule: 
The presence of a hemothorax triggers the following goal- 
setting rule: 
The attitude toward this therapeulic goal is thus updated 
from U to R, and the goal is referred to the planner. A 
planner such as TraumAID's would recommend address- 
ing it through the insertion of a chest tube, Evidence that 
a chest tube has been inserted leads to a goal becoming 
relevant of ensuring its proper placement, and of checking 
that it is functioning correctly. In addition to these two 
cycles of reasoning and activity (a subsequent X-ray is 
required to check proper placement), the following rule is 
evaluated to check that the treatment goal for the simple 
hemothorax is actually satisfied: 
In summary, we have tracked the hemothorax from the 
initial wound report, through its suspicion as more inves- 
tigation is recommended, continuing with the acquisition 
of more evidence that allows for concluding its presence 
and the need to address it, and finally, making sure that 
the treatment actually works. 
5 Reasoning with Contradictory Information 
5.1 Explicit Representation of Negation 
Even though I is part of both our belief and attitude bi- 
lattices, it will never appear in practice given the basic 
inference paradigm. One may argue this to be a good 
feature of our inference system, since I will often lead 
to a host of problems (see [Ginsberg 881). On the other 
hand, I=T+F, and can thus be used to represent the co- 
presence of contradictory evidence. Explicit representa- 
tion of contradictions provides a system with important 
flexibility. Consider, for example, the diagnosis of a Ten- 
sion Pneumothord (TP). Two alternative methods can 
be used for that purpose: 
2. Needleaspirafion1:he~t(Positive) 
+ TensionPneumothorax 
Medically, positive indication in one of the tests is enough 
for the diagnosis to be justifiably made. However, a physi- 
cian will also assume lack of tension pneumothorax if any 
of the two tests has come up negative. It is medically un- 
justified to take the other test as well. Unfortunately, by 
our semantic interpretation of the above rules, TP will be 
tagged unknown (F V U) in such case. It was not proved, 
but cannot be dismissed since not all the rules have failed. 
To account for that description, we may choose to aug- 
ment the above rules as follows: 
I '. X-rayshows-EnsionPneumothorar A 
compatible-with(Needleaspirationrhest(Positive)) 
+ TensionPneumothorax 
2 '. Needleaspiration~hest(Positive) A 
compatible-wi:h(X-rayshows-TensionPneu~notlrorax) 
+ TensionPneumothorax 
The added antecedents will cause the failure of both rules 
if any of the tests comes up negative. Otherwise, if any or 
both tests come up positive, and there is no contradictory 
evidence, TP is positively concluded. 
We now consider the case in which tests provide con- 
tradictory evidence. As so far presented, both rules will 
fail and a negative TP will be assessed. While for some 
propositions that may be a plausible solution, it is not the 
medical interpretation in the case of a TP. In that case, 
medical practice will default to positive treatment. 
So far, in our semantics, a proposition was true or false if 
it was so asserted or concluded. It was unknown if it was 
not reported or could not be concluded. In other words, 
unknown arose from lack of knowledge. Contradictions 
belong to a different class of unknowns. To reason about 
contradictions, we first extend the original rule representa- 
tion to allow a header to be a negated proposition. Then, 
we can simply add two more rules to the original ones: 
'A tension pneumothorax is a condition in which air leaks 
into the chest cavity between the chest wall and the lung to the 
point beyond which the return of blood to the heart is at risk. 
The added rules model explicitly the consequences of neg- 
ative test results. In addition, we redefine the inference 
to a form which is closer to Ginsberg's and which allows 
combining negative and positive contributions: 
Definition 5.1 Consistent Inference (redefined) 
An attitude-belief ( d A ,  4 ~ )  is a consistent inference for a 
problem instance P iff 
1. It coincides with OBS, i.e V h€ Mo q6B@)=OBS(h);_ 
2. For any proposition d€H-Mo, let {&};k,Lbe all the 
evidential rules with d in their header, {R, If=, all 
the evidential rules with ~d in their header, then 
3. Similarly, for any proposition d€H, let {&):=rbe all 
the goal-setting rules with d in  their header, {R,}:=, 
all the goal-setting rules with  din their header, then 
'$A (d) = attitude-'(Ci';=, (4; (body(&)) V U)+ 
+ ~f=~( -9 ; (bodY(Z) )  A U)); 
Using the new inference procedure, given the above rules, 
TP will be assigned a I belief, to indicate the contradic- 
tory information with respect to its presence. 
5.2 Dealing with Contradictions 
Apart from their actual representation, two major concerns 
need be addressed when one represents and reasons about 
contradictory information. The first problem is a technical 
one: under the above inference scheme, I propagates 
itself. We call that problem pollution, and a few hints 
as to how to deal with it can be found in [Rymon 931. 
The second problem is the semantic interpretation of I, 
i.e. what to do with a proposition for which a I belief 
(attitude) is assigned? 
Unfortunately, the answer here varies. In some cases, a 
positive default is appropriate whereas in other circum- 
stances a negative one is more plausible. In some circum- 
stances, none of the conclusions can be safely made and 
further investigation is warranted. In other cases a default 
to a particular treatment (e.g. the TP case) is appropriate 
whereas in yet other circumstances, a conclusive decision 
is irrelevant to solving the problem. 
The GDD principle provides us with a major escape by 
stating that irrelevant contradictions need not be bothered 
with. That, of course does not free us completely and in 
general the desired behavior should be encoded. In the 
TP case, we have: 
6 Summary and Early Evaluation 
We assume that diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent 
that it can affect decisions, and so have presented a for- 
malization of a goal-directed diagnostic paradigm (GDD). 
In contrast to other diagnostic paradigm, GDD defines a 
solution to a diagnostic problem not only in explanation 
terms, but also and more importantly in terms of the rec- 
ommendations it implies. 
GDD works within the exploratory-corrective manage- 
ment (ECM) architecture in which control cycles between 
a diagnostic reasoner, planner, and an actor. In this archi- 
tecture, diagnosis is used to initiate both diagnostic and 
therapeutic goals, to adapt those goals to reflect new infor- 
mation, and to verify their actual achievement. Planning 
is used to address and mediate between concurrent diag- 
nostic and therapeutic needs. 
The new MVL-based formalization of GDD extends the 
original paradigm and allows reasoning with contradic- 
tory information and with defaults. A number of diagnos- 
tic and therapeutic strategies were shown to be naturally 
implementable in this framework CRymon 931. 
TraurnAID Webber et al 921 is a consultation system for 
multiple trauma management which has been developed 
over the past eight years as a collaboration between the 
Department of Computer and Information Science in the 
University of Pennsylvania and the Department of Surgery 
in the Medical College of Pennsylvania. Its new version, 
TraumAID 2.0, implements an ECM architecture in which 
diagnostic reasoning is complemented with a planning ca- 
pability. TraumAID 2.0 has been successfully validated 
on 266 theoretical cases. Under a grant from AHCPR and 
with the help of a panel of national trauma management 
experts, we began evaluating its recommendations with 
respect to actual care provided by physicians in MCP, as 
well as to that of an earlier version. 
The MVL-based formalization of GDD is new and extends 
the diagnostic reasoning in TraumAID 2.0. It has been 
implemented in prototype form and has been functionally 
tested on parts of TraumAID's knowledge-base. 
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